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The paper provides a comparative investigation into public attitudes to family policies. It shows 
that citizens’ support for family policies is diverse across different welfare regimes with respect 
to four countries belonging to distinct regimes: the UK, Germany, Norway and Slovenia. Using 
qualitative data, we unpack the ways individuals view the need for family policies, the rationale 
they use to explain their support for family policies and for imposing restrictions on access to 
family policies – i.e. why, for whom, and under which conditions. We find that social rights 
narratives are common in Norway; a social investment logic is prevalent in Germany and 
Slovenia; while in the UK the dominant view is closer to the work-central individualized 
responsibility narrative of neoliberalism. In addition, we find differences across regimes in who 
family policies should target. In the UK and Germany, the focus is much more on providing 
support to activate parents, while in Norway and partly Slovenia the focus is on providing well-
being for children. The findings show that despite some convergence in family policies across 
Europe in recent times, we still find clear diversity in what and for whom family policies are 
for, its rationale largely embedded in the larger institutional normative structures of the welfare 
state. The results not only contribute to the literature on the relationship between public attitudes 
and welfare institutions, but also point towards shifting ideas about the role of family policies 
in the context of societal change.  
 





Developments in European welfare states have for some time been characterized by the 
introduction of cuts and austerity measures in almost all areas of the welfare state (Taylor-
Gooby, Leruth & Chung , 2017). Opposing this general trend, the past three decades or so have 
seen an expansion in family policies (Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2015), indicating a 
convergence in the increasing relevance of this policy field. In addition, an important 
convergence trend was in the role of European Union and its activities concerning how family 
policies are shaped and the larger rationale behind its introduction in the political discourse, 
especially with growing importance of social investment logic in the European social model 
(see Hemerijck, 2017). Still, following the Great Recession in 2008, family policy was not 
completely safe from cuts, especially with regard to cash benefits (Bothfeld & Rouault, 2015). 
Consequently, conditionality in family policies is increasingly common.  
 
This paper aims to capture facets of the perceptions of family policies. Our analysis builds on 
the assumption that support for certain family policies is based on a wide range of reasons, 
ranging from the extension of social rights, to a more neoliberal approach grounded in the need 
to activate the labour force. Our main research interest is unpacking the meaning held by the 
general support for family policies in different welfare regimes. We provide insights into how 
individuals reason and capture differences and similarities across regimes in their perceptions 
of what and for whom family policies should be, examining whether convergence or regime 
differences prevail. We adopt a qualitative methodology based on analysis of data from focus 
groups in four European countries (UK, Germany, Norway and Slovenia), in contrast to the 
mostly quantitative approaches taken to the study of welfare attitudes (Chung, Taylor-Gooby, 
& Leruth, 2018). The main contribution of the methodological approach adopted in this paper 
lies in its ability to give insights into citizens’ reasoning and rationale behind policy issues 
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within a cross-country comparison. That is, seemingly similar attitudes and preferences may 
rest on different sets of underlying motivations and rationales. We maintain that attitudes to 
family policy may be interpreted in various ways across regimes/countries relative to their 
ideological stances and purpose/aim. Another added value of the paper is that the qualitative 
data presented are comparable cross-nationally, which is rarely the case with such data. 
 
Focus group discussions were conducted in four European countries that represent distinct 
welfare regimes (UK, Germany, Norway and Slovenia) (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 
Ferrarini, & Englund, 2013; Javornik, 2020) to ask which welfare benefits or services should 
be provided to whom, and under what conditions. Therefore, our research was framed on the 
conditionality perspective as a central dimension of social policy, trying to understand the 
‘levels’ and ‘levers’ of conditionality (see Clasen & Clegg, 2007) and deservingness criteria 
(see van Oorschot & Roosma, 2017). In addition, following the distinction between different 
approaches to family policy drawn by Daly (2019), we leveraged the division between child-
centred and parent-centred viewpoints as determined by whether the primary focus for family 
policy support is on children or adults. We chose this approach in our comparative analysis 
because previous studies have shown that current policy structures (Chung & Meuleman, 2017) 
and institution/regime typologies (Larsen, 2008; Valarino et al., 2017; Toikko & Rantanen, 
2017) are largely responsible for shaping attitudes to welfare policies. Hence, we expect to find 
differences across regimes in how individuals view the conditionalities in family policies and 
the logic behind these beliefs. In line with the family policies chosen for discussion by the focus 
group participants spontaneously, we narrow our focus to three core family-policy areas (see 
Gauthier, 2010): childcare, child/family cash benefits, and parental leave. This enables a 
‘bottom-up’ approach without the steering and introduction of policy areas by researchers, 
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differing from a top-down approach in a pre-designed survey questionnaire (see Taylor-Gooby 
& Leruth, 2018; Chung, Taylor-Gooby, & Leruth, 2018).  
 
The next section examines what we know so far about ideological stances in welfare policies, 
more specifically in the provision of family policies. We go on to discuss paradigmatic trends 
and changes in conditionalities in family policies in the four countries, discussing our findings 
in relation to these paradigms based on the focus group participants’ views and rationales for 
support as well as the conditionality within family policies.  
 
Family policy and a conditionality perspective 
Welfare paradigms and family policies 
Understanding differences in citizens’ support for family policies across different welfare 
regimes can be based on three different paradigms that characterize(d) reforms of the welfare 
states. Namely,  social policies in general, as well as family policies in particular, have been 
expanded through various paradigms that differ in their diagnosis of the problems, their 
solutions and instruments, and justification for state involvement (see Morel, Palier & Palme, 
2012).   
 
First, the Keynesian strategies that dominated during the post-war period in Europe 
concentrated on increasing demand through public spending, generous social benefits, and 
social insurance schemes. This approach centred on the principle of equality. Welfare policies 
were developed as part of individuals’ social rights (Marshall, 1950) and family income support 
(including child benefit) was expanded in many countries during this period. This meant a 
strong emphasis on family-oriented policies, recognizing family support as a social right of 
adults, while the focus on children was only indirect. In addition, public childcare was already 
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being developed during this period in countries like Sweden and Denmark in response to 
demands for greater gender equality, and the pedagogical needs of children. This explains why 
even today these policies can be considered part of social rights (Ministry of Education and 
Science in Sweden, 1999; Ellingsæter & Gulbrandsen, 2007).  
 
In the 1970s, following the oil price hike and slow economic growth, a neoliberal paradigm 
developed as a direct attack on Keynesian policies (Morel, Palier, & Palme, 2012). 
Retrenchment of the welfare state, characterized by a tightening of benefit conditions and 
privatization of public services, was seen as part of the solution. This led to increased 
conditionality for families seeking income support. However, neoliberal policies do not 
necessarily require retrenching all areas of social policy. A workfare approach, chiefly aimed 
at enabling parents to remain in or join the workforce, was enabled by expanding childcare or 
parental leave schemes. Here, family policies were not based on a right but were rather a way 
to ‘activate’ individuals by targeting a certain population based on conditionality criteria, while 
service provision was chiefly market-based (Mahon et al., 2012).  
 
The social investment paradigm emerged as a critique of the neoliberal agenda and perceives 
social policies as a long-term investment. However, it does not prioritise reducing poverty or 
social inequality and places less emphasis on provision of welfare as a social right (Jenson 
2009). Social investment theories focus on policies that invest in the human capital of workers 
to increase their employability (Morel, Palier & Palme, 2012), where social rights are tethered 
to an economic agenda. Formal childcare meets two goals: first, as an investment in future 
human resources (children); second, to facilitate the full use of female human capital. Family 
policies hence remain parent-centred yet usually childhood-oriented; emphasizing not only 
parental work duties but also a well-resourced childhood as preparation for adult life (Daly, 
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2019). Put differently, children are treated primarily as “citizen-workers of the future” or 
“adults in becoming” (Lister, 2003; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006) .  
 
The distinction between the neoliberal vs. social investment drivers of childcare policies across 
countries and care regimes has already been identified by Mahon and colleagues (2012) in their 
analysis of childcare policy developments in Canada, Australia comparing them to that of 
Finland, and Sweden. They claim that while these two distinct clusters of countries both use 
social investment and neoliberal frames, they are still bounded by historical legacies and 
institutionally embedded policies and discourses. In other words, in Canada and Australia social 
investment strategies are bounded by neoliberal frames of free choice. Similarly, in this paper 
we maintain that given the historical legacies of the four countries under study, the 
logic/paradigms behind the support for family policies (especially childcare) will be diverse. 
To better understand this, we need to consider the legacies and recent developments in the 
conditionalities of family policies across the four countries. 
 
Paradigm trends and conditionalities in family policies across the four countries 
Two trends can be seen as a point of convergence within family policies, namely the social 
investment emphasis, linked to the context of European Union, as well as neoliberal agenda, 
related to the austerity measures in times of economic crisis after 2008. Consistent with the 
activation emphasis and the social investment perspective, childcare policies have been 
expanded in recent years, particularly in countries that had poorly developed childcare services 
(Adema, Clarke & Thévenon, 2020). For instance, Germany has significantly increased the 
public provision of childcare. Childcare has also been expanded in the UK, but with subsidized 
childcare mainly for poor families or for those meeting certain in-work criteria. By contrast, 
Norway has one of the highest levels of childcare coverage in the EU (Eurostat, 2019), and 
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children have a statutory right to day care from age 1. Similarly, Slovenia’s socialist legacy of 
well-developed childcare services was sheltered from any major cuts, with unconditional access 
for all children above 11 months.  
 
In the context of the neoliberal agenda, with various degrees and variations across countries, a 
general trend that can be observed is increased prioritizing of parental employment, as well as 
greater conditionality, in particular by linking provision of rights to employment records. While 
the more universally-oriented child(hood)-centred approach in family policy leans more 
towards developing children as human capital (Morel, Palier & Palme, 2012), the more 
conditional parent-centred approach prioritizes facilitating parental employment, with the 
particular goal of increasing women’s participation in the labour market (Jenson, 2009). 
 
In accessing family benefits, there is a trend toward greater selectivity with an emphasis on 
means-testing and need. This is a subversion of the principle of universality which was once 
enshrined in family polices across Europe (Daly, 2019). The employment of mothers (especially 
lone mothers) has been stimulated by changes to benefit and taxation policy in addition to the 
growth in childcare provision, especially in the UK and Germany (Daly & Ferragina 2018; 
Windebank, 2017). Concurrently, there has been a general trend towards increased selectivity 
in child benefits. In Slovenia, for example, austerity measures were most pronounced in the 
area of family cash benefits, which were framed as social transfers for the most needy (Filipovič 
Hrast & Rakar, 2020). Similarly, in the UK, the once universal child benefit was limited to 
children only from low-income families and a two-child limit was imposed on child tax credit 
and universal credit. Among the countries examined, Norway and Germany still have a 
universal child benefit. While it is becoming increasingly modest in relative terms in Norway, 
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child benefits remain a crucial and largely uncontested element of the conservative heritage of 
German family policy. 
 
With regard to parental leave, the general trend has been to expanding fathers’ rights to 
extended leave, in countries like Norway, Germany and Slovenia. At the same time, a key 
motivation has been to support women’s labour market participation. In Germany, an extension 
of the parental leave scheme was introduced in 2015 that seeks to combine the two goals: 
parental benefits in this scheme are conditional on both parents working part-time and taking 
part-time parental leave. In the UK, shared parental leave has been expanded whereby a father 
can take up the remaining weeks of maternity leave not been used by the mother. Still, due to 
low replacement rates, its take up has been minimal. In terms of conditionality for parental 
leave schemes, a convergence is observed in the recent shifts to mixed systems that combine 
(flat-rate) citizenship-based parental leave rights with (more generous) employment-based 
parental leave rights (Dobrotič & Blum, 2019b; Morel et al., 2012). 
 
Despite the discussed convergences, historical and institutional legacies play an important role 
and form a relevant background for understanding citizens’ views. Differences between family 
policies are, like for other social policies, rooted in “ideological notions on social citizenship” 
(Kvist, 2007: 200), which refers to the dominant perceptions of the state’s role in providing 
opportunities and services to individuals (Clasen & Clegg, 2007; Dobrotić & Blum, 2019a). In 
social-democratic welfare states (e.g., Norway), social rights are traditionally universal and tied 
to citizenship or residence, while in conservative (e.g., Germany) and liberal (e.g., UK) regimes 
social rights are conditional, based on employment in the former and need in the latter (Esping-
Andersen 1990). In Slovenia, we find a hybrid model that combines elements of the 




We may therefore expect the different welfare regimes to influence citizens’ attitudes, since 
existing policy structures shape their attitudes to welfare and views on the extent to which the 
state should provide a certain benefit or service (Ahn & Kim, 2014; Goerres & Tepe, 2010, 
2012) or who deserves those benefits or services (Koostra & Roosma 2018). Institutional 
contexts may shape how individuals rely on their ideological stances to find a narrative for not 
only who should receive what, but also why this should be the case. We will analyse how 
citizens in the four countries being studied understand family policies and the related 
conditionalities in their countries relative to the three paradigms described (Keynesianism, 
neoliberal paradigm, social investment paradigm), and variation in their reasoning for offering 
support (i.e., parent- or child(hood)-centred rationale).  
 
Design and Methods 
In order to study individuals’ support for family policies through their conditionality 
perceptions, we use data from focus groups carried out in the capitals of the four analysed 
countries (UK, Norway, Germany, Slovenia) in 2016 as part of the comparative, NORFACE-
funded research project “Our Children’s Europe” (2015–2018). In each country, in order to 
obtain a wide range of discussions and diversity of opinions, five focus groups were conducted 
among different socio-demographic groups that discussed several vignettes representing 
diverse target groups (see Appendix). For the present article, we analyse the data on the 
aggregate country level, not the group level, yet we acknowledge additional differences exist 
across gender, class, age lines (Chung & Meuleman, 2017; Garritzmann & Schwander, 2021), 
which are beyond the scope of our article. The differences across countries were generally much 
more evident than among various socio-demographic groups within countries (Taylor-Gooby 




The design of the focus groups was the same in each country. Every focus group had 8 to 10 
participants of a different age, gender, family status, education, occupation, income, political 
orientation and migration background, and the discussion lasted two hours. After an 
introductory exercise concerning the participants’ general views on the welfare state, the 
participants discussed several vignettes in terms of the benefits and services the predefined 
target groups deserved and the conditions, if any, that should apply. We were particularly 
interested in the attitudes and discussions on the vignette that describes a family on an average 
wage with children under 3 years of age in good health, although the participants also discussed 
issues referring to family policy with respect to other vignettes, which we took into account 
where relevant (see Appendix). It was up to the participants to decide which family policy 
measures they wished to discuss. Transcripts of the discussions were coded in NVivo using a 
comparative and commonly agreed coding scheme, relying on a combination of deductive and 
inductive approaches to coding. Based on this, we performed a systematic comparative analysis 
of the participants’ attitudes to family policy in the countries under study (see Appendix, as 
well as Our Children's Europe project’s open access data repository (Taylor-Gooby, 2020).  
 
Citizens’ attitudes to conditionality in family policies in the four countries 
 
The UK 
The policies most commonly discussed in the UK were public childcare, or the lack thereof, 
and child benefits. However, some of the discussions on child benefits were mixed with 
discussions surrounding other benefits provided to the unemployed. This is due to the welfare 
benefit systems in the UK, where many of the benefits individuals can receive for childcare 
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purposes (e.g., childcare tax credits) are income-linked, while other benefits (e.g., housing) are 
directly means-tested, whereby having a child influences access to these benefits.  
 
Most of the discussion centred on the impact on parents – their right or ability to work, and the 
financial impact of having children, rather than the impact family policies may have on children. 
The few exceptions were when participants talked about how the lack of provisions might end 
up “penalising the kids” (UK, Y-n.i. (1)). 
 
One reason for this parent-centred discussion is the cost of childcare in the UK, which is among 
the most expensive among all OECD/European countries. There is also a lack of childcare 
spaces, especially for younger children (Chung, Hrast, & Rakar, 2018). Against this backdrop, 
the main discussions focused on the cost of childcare and how, without well-paid jobs, most 
parents are unable to cover this cost.  
 
It is extremely expensive and there is very little incentive to go back to work as a mother. 
You have got to be earning a lot over the national average to be able to just break even 
after childcare. (UK, MC-1) 
 
When talking about a low-income family with children and what they might need, childcare 
emerged as a key policy the welfare state should provide.  
 
So, you might be better off not working and just stay at home. They need to do 




We generally found that in the UK the narratives were embedded in a neoliberal paradigm with 
acceptance of stringent conditionalities and a targeted approach to those in need. The main 
conditionality considered was family income levels, clearly relying on a needs-based 
justification. In addition, participants’ understanding of the context of the high-cost of childcare 
also shaped their perception of ‘need’ (also see Chung & Meuleman, 2017). There was much 
discussion around single parents and their additional needs due to the lack of a partner able to 
provide additional financial support or care.  
 
If you are a single parent, then it may be very difficult to work unless there is totally 
free childcare provided. (UK, MC-n.i.) 
 
Need was also used to frame who should receive priority in receiving benefits and services; 
namely, that benefits and services should not be ‘wasted’ on those who do not need it. When 
talking about free childcare hours: 
 
It seems crazy that it is a blanket thing, but not everybody needs that. It seems like a bit 
of a waste to me. … (UK, MC-10) 
 
This once again points to the fact that participants regarded childcare more as a device to enable 
parents (back) into work, rather than a part of children’s social rights to early education. 
 
In 2017, the UK government capped child benefits to two children, meaning no benefits are 
given for third or additional children. This was mentioned in the description given in the 
narrative of the typical “benefit scrounger” in the UK (i.e., individuals who are considered to 




I do agree in capping benefits because if you are not going to work and you are just 
popping out kids every year…. (UK, Y- n.i.) 
 
Generally, participants expressed stigma against benefit recipients, especially those receiving 
Jobseeker’s Allowance on top of child benefits (also see Baumberg, Bell & Gaffney, 2012).  
 
There was some infrequent support for universal benefits and services. One participant 
commented on the bureaucratic nature of means-testing, while others talked about the benefits 
of a universal system like in Sweden where “everybody pays quite a bit more tax […] but then 
you get so much more” (UK, Y-n.i.).  
 
Very few participants pointed to social rights to support their positions. The only mentions 
came on the very few occasions when maternity and paternity leave were discussed – namely, 
the need to have more paternity leave was taken up by participants as an issue of the social right 
of fathers to be able to take leave as much as mothers do, framed in the language of “choice”. 
 
The majority of discussions on why welfare should be given, or which conditionality should be 
used, centred heavily on economic reasoning. For example, one of the most frequent claims 
was that publicly provided childcare services are generally needed because otherwise the costs 
would hinder parents from working. Much of the discussion touched on the economic 
calculations families need to make while deciding to work vs. being on benefits in the current 
policy contexts. In other words, “reluctant individualism” (Taylor-Gooby, Leruth & Chung, 
2019) was prevalent in the UK data, where the focus was mostly on giving individuals the 
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opportunity to take part in the labour market so as to earn a living, which was regarded as an 
individual’s highest responsibility. 
 
The reciprocity rationale did arise; namely, the potential of additional tax revenues that can be 
gained by enabling parents to work by increasing access to childcare services. Interestingly, 
even here, social investment narratives were not as common as one would expect. The majority 
of participants believed the main role of childcare services is to enable parents to re-enter the 
workforce, since individuals’ upmost responsibility is participating in the labour market and 
earning a living. 
 
Germany 
In Germany, the discussions mostly revolved around childcare, while parental leave and family 
tax deductions were rarely discussed. This focus on childcare reflects the political debate 
underway at the time of the fieldwork, with free childcare and the expansion of childcare having 
then been on the political agenda. This focus reflects the individual concerns of participants, 
with many relating to personal stories of difficulties finding or paying for childcare.  
 
The discussions were mostly parent-centred, where the strongest narrative was that working 
parents should be provided with childcare: 
 
I think childcare should be free. … So that both parents can go to work. (DE, MC-7) 
 
However, many statements calling for statutory action in childcare provision did not explicitly 
refer to the needs of working parents, and the dual-worker model was an implicit point of 
reference for almost all participants. This dual-worker model was only explicitly questioned by 
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one participant who emphasized, from a mostly parent-centred perspective, the high workload 
in dual-worker families:  
 
I think the state should support the family so that one of the parents can stay at home to 
take care of the children. I see it again and again with parents […], they’re under stress, 
under pressure, and sometimes really become ill. (DE, WC-4) 
 
Among the few child-centred statements, none were in favour of the single-earner model (as 
one might expect for Germany), but instead the relevance of early childhood education was 
highlighted. Here, childcare was understood as being vital for preparing children for life, in line 
with the social investment paradigm:  
 
But I think nursery school is very important for preparing children for social contact in 
life and for beginning to learn and follow a schedule. Not every parent can teach this. 
(DE, Y-3) 
 
Early childhood education was often also understood as vital for creating equal starting 
opportunities. Educational inequalities were a crucial topic in general in the discussions, and 
this was also visible in the debates on family policies. 
 
[…] when those who have a lot of money send their children to private nursery schools, 
then you start with this two-class society. I think everyone should go to nursery schools, 




Consequently, it is no surprise that many participants were in support of universal and 
unconditional childcare. Participants agreed that universal childcare should be provided by the 
state, and no one at any time suggested that childcare should only be for working parents. Still, 
positions were quite divided on the role of means-testing. While several participants stressed 
that childcare should be free, others expressed that it should be income-related.  
 
It is also in this context where the sole explicitly social-right-related discussion was observed, 
with one participant asserting that childcare is a right of both children and parents:  
 
If the nursery school teachers/caregivers can still be adequately paid and don’t suffer in 
any way, then I think it’s good [that childcare is free of charge], because every child has 
the right to that, and every family. (DE, Y-3) 
 
Interestingly, those in favour of income-related childcare costs did not rely on a ‘last resort’ 
position, whereby social services should only be for the poor. Instead, the rationale behind 
income-related childcare costs was mainly that better-off earners should also pay their fair 
share:  
 
You could expect those families earning a certain net amount might have to pay 
something into it additionally for childcare, for instance in order to finance less fortunate 
families […]. (DE, MC-7) 
 
The German debates show that the neoliberal position on a family policy that should support 
the dual-worker model is well grounded in citizens’ ideological thinking. Almost all 
participants saw childcare as a crucial instrument for ensuring both parents could participate 
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actively in the labour market, and hence the discussion was largely parent-centred. Certainly, 
while interpreting the data, we had to take into account that the discussions took place in Berlin, 
which is not only a big city but also partly has an East German legacy (2). Discussions in rural 
areas in former West Germany might have produced different results. Nevertheless, it is 
remarkable that in a country which around a decade ago had a highly conservative family 
policy, not a single child-centred or pro home-care statement appears. Instead, as the discussion 
shows, the social-investment-related idea of early childhood education as vital for children’s 
future prospects is strongly immanent in citizens’ sense-making.  
 
Norway 
An extensive range of policies was considered relevant for children and families in Norway. 
Equality and social inclusion were dominant justifications for many of the positions held. The 
issue of conditionality emerged while discussing needs related to risks such as unemployment 
or lone parenthood. While there was more support for universal access to services than for 
benefits, it was widely accepted that ‘needy’ families could receive higher benefits or pay less 
than the already subsidized standard fee for such services (e.g., day care), or alternatively lower 
taxes.  
 
I think that lower taxes for single parents are important […] you will have more money 
left over to pay bills […]. (NO, W-1) 
 
While institutional childcare was seen to support the dual-earner model, some participants also 
framed it as being positive for the child. In contrast to the other countries (especially the UK), 
children were clearly identified as deserving in their capacity as children, regardless of what 




Deserve it or not? That’s the question. The issue, when speaking of day-care, is the 
children who deserve it, regardless of whether the parents follow the rules or earn more 
money or less money. (NO, WC-6) 
 
Similarly, some participants demonstrated a child-centred perspective on unemployment 
entitlements. It was generally agreed that children should not bear the burden of their parents’ 
unemployment or other forms of hardship.  
 
Children should have the same right to education and healthcare […]. It shouldn’t make 
a difference if the parents lose their jobs. It shouldn’t matter for the children’s education. 
(NO, WC-7)  
 
This viewpoint implicitly centres on the needs of the child and mainly follows a social rights-
based logic, prioritizing children’s needs and well-being regardless of the cost to the public 
purse. Universal (i.e., affordable and readily available) institutionalized childcare benefits 
children and parents alike.  
 
Regarding an after-school programme and day-care: […] for example, children of 
immigrants and economically disadvantaged groups, they would benefit from the social 
setting that day-care offers. Another thing is that women [..] lose […] pension points. 
(NO, R-6) 
 
Another topic framed in relation to both the child and the parents was parental leave in general 




The part of parental leave that is reserved for the father has been cut by 4 weeks or 
something. It should be raised again. […]. It matters a lot that a child has a good 
relationship with their father, but also so the mum can get outside.... (NO, Y-2) 
 
Means-testing was mainly discussed with respect to child benefits. However, no consensus was 
reached on means-testing versus the current universal child benefit. At present, a modest, flat-
rate child benefit is awarded per child from birth until age 18 (3). A key issue is that, in real 
terms, its relative value has declined significantly over the past 20 years. At the time of the 
focus groups (October 2016), the nominal benefit amount had not been increased since 1996. 
Therefore, a common position held in the debate was that means-testing would allow a 
considerable increase in child benefit for those who actually need it.  
 
The discussion on whether [child benefits] should be means tested or not, I actually 
think it was about time, because for some it means nothing, while others would need 
more to make ends meet. (NO, MC-6) 
 
Overall, while there was some disagreement on the details of the institutional design, strong 
support was given for having a range of universally available services. Only a few statements 
revealed a clear social investment rationale. The simple message was that in the long run society 
benefits both economically and socially.  
 
I think for the future it is important to invest in families with young children who are 





The discussions in Slovenia largely concerned the issue of child benefits and subsidies for 
public childcare, without any discussion of parental leave policies. It was asserted that the state 
should help parents in supporting their children, (i.e., to bear some of the costs). The dominant 
parent-centred statements were linked to economic reasoning and the parent’s labour market 
participation. However, these ideas were not very clearly expressed and seemed to be the basis 
for launching further discussions on the conditionality of benefits and subsidies (i.e., the 
difference in amount and/or duration of subsidies and childcare services between employed and 
unemployed parents, and the relevance of parents’ income). It was rare for participants to 
explicitly mention the importance of public childcare for parents being able to work, although 
one quote below illustrates this clearly. This line of reasoning is linked to the long tradition of 
public childcare provision and near full employment of women (Kanjuo Mrčela & Černigoj 
Sadar, 2011). 
 
Because more people are working, contributing to the state, we can actually do more as 
a state. So, these subsidies are very logical from this point of view because they 
encourage that as much as possible mothers or fathers .... Also, because of women. 
Women are not excluded from the labour market for such a long time, because it can 
later be hard to integrate back into work. (SI, MC-7) 
 
Like in the UK, a parent-centred discussion also took place surrounding the impact of benefits 
on work motivation and labour market inclusion. The lack of incentives to work due to the 





But there is one group of people which exploit it quite well and live well, and for whom 
it does not pay to go to work because then they would lose all these transfers and, if they 
received a pay check, they would essentially give over all of their salary to pay for 
kindergarten, school, because they have become more expensive and so, essentially, in 
a way the state promotes that you don't work, that you live at the expense of the state. 
(SI, W-4) 
 
Child-centred statements were also made, with child benefits recognized as a right of children 
(“The child benefit belongs to the child. It’s not for the parent.” (SI, WC-7)), in line with social 
rights rationale. Transfers and care were understood as a social right of the child and therefore 
no conditions should be imposed on children, including conditions based on parental income.  
 
Let’s say that child benefits amount to EUR 110. Every child gets it, regardless of 
whether their parents have a salary of EUR 5,000 or EUR 300. (SI, WC-7)  
 
That’s the moral solution, yes. (SI, WC-2).  
 
The social investment perspective was seen in support of public childcare and therefore the 
development of children’s skills, their socialization, and their integration.   
 
After all, the mere fact that children are in kindergarten is an essential part of the 
education and socialization of a child .... And this is also a strong aspect of the welfare 




Despite the unconditionality present in more child-centred parts of the discussion, most of the 
statements made were conditional. The conditions were linked to family income (“Those who 
have more should pay more.” (SI, WC-1)), and parental status, (e.g., single parenthood, family 
size). All these statements seem to be based on need.  
 
I don’t agree with the idea of an equal price for kindergarten for everyone… I believe a 
family with that amount of income should pay less than someone with a decent income 
who can afford to save money and invest in funds. (SI, Y-3) 
 
And not just that, it's not only about the money, one parent who is a single parent, who 
doesn't have any parents, or relatives or such... I would say that they are entitled to some 
transfers, simply because they are alone for everything. (SI, W-9) 
 
Another dimension of conditionality was linked to willingness to work, consistent with 
neoliberal thinking. This was seen as something upon which the receipt of benefits should 
depend. 
 
A further position in support of family policies centred on support for children and large 
families that would later be returned to society through employment and taxes while also 
supporting pension systems. Such reciprocity rationale was mainly linked to the social 
investment perspective of investing in children. 
 
I agree with you, what will eight children be, a burden on the welfare state but, on the 
other hand, all these people, not only will they work for pensions, our pensions, they 




Discussion and conclusion  
 
In discussing family policies, similar patterns appeared in all four countries, showing strong 
support for childcare based on social investment and neoliberal rationale, as well as the 
tendency to apply conditions to child benefit. This indicates that the discussed regime 
convergences in family policies are also accompanied by a certain convergence in attitudes 
among the population. However, historical legacies and welfare regimes still largely shaped the 
narratives and rationale used in the debates across the countries. Norway, for example, stands 
out as family policies were seen almost exclusively unconditionally and based on social rights. 
When conditions, especially need, were applied, this was only related to benefits on top of the 
universal benefits and services. There were more discussions around conditionality in the UK 
in line with the neoliberal discourse of targeted means-tested benefits and activating the 
workforce. Neoliberal economic reasoning was also present in Germany, yet the discussion was 
largely framed within the social investment perspective of investing in children for the future 
good of the economy. In Slovenia, discussions were characterized by a mix of universality and 
conditionality, while a substantial part of the discussion was also framed around the social 
investment logic of the benefits for future society. Furthermore, there were clear variations 
among the countries in the family policies that the participants drew out for discussion, showing 
a link to regime/country differences in the relevance and significance of the particular family 
policy field. All this indicates that citizens’ positions and reasoning about family policy are 
framed by the existing institutional logic and as such, policy debates are co-influencing and are 
being co-influenced by this underlying logic and reasoning (Mau, 2003).   
 
The more child-centred the discussion, the more the statements made were unconditional. The 
child-centred perspective dominated the discussion in Norway. It was also present in Slovenia 
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and to a smaller extent in Germany, yet it was nearly absent in the UK. Hence, with the 
exception of Norway, a parent-centred focus prevailed. This might be linked to the fact that 
income benefits generally target parents and build on the condition of need, understood as a 
characteristic of families (Frazer & Marlier, 2017). As Daly (2019) notes, family policy is 
constrained by family law, since parents are obliged to support their children, which explains 
the dominance of the parent-centred approach.  
 
However, our findings indicate that the parent-centred approach is often linked to the labour 
market, either from the social investment perspective or a more neoliberal or productivist 
perspective (Van der Veen & Groot, 2006). In other words, the main focus was on increasing 
labour market participation, which also becomes part of the conditionality embedded in support 
for the family policy. According to Daly (2019), even though it may seem that the social 
investment perspective is child-centred, the focus is more on childhood as a life course. Hence, 
children are actually seen from the perspective of becoming adults, i.e., objects for the future 
(and future workers and taxpayers) rather than as the subject of policies (Lister, 2003; Jenson 
& Saint-Martin, 2006). This was evident in the discussions around societal reciprocity and the 
notion of ‘children as the adults of tomorrow’. When considering the adult-centred view of 
parents’ labour market participation, the social investment perspective was not far from the 
neoliberal one. This echoes what has been raised by others who note that social investment 
strategies are less redistributive and less protective of the most vulnerable (Cantillon, 2011; 
Cantillon & Van Lancker, 2013) and can go hand-in-hand with retrenchment (Van Kersbergen, 
Vis, & Hemerijck 2014).  
 
To conclude, this study provides a better understanding of the cross-country variation in 
individuals’ support for family policies and their underlying reasoning – i.e. for whom it is for, 
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and their rationale for imposing restrictions in access to family policies. Despite some 
similarities in the support for family policies, there were clear variations found across countries. 
More specifically, although support for more family policies can be interpreted as a move 
towards a social-investment-paradigm-led welfare state development, support for family 
policies can also be understood as citizens’ support for a social-rights-based approach or even 
support for the neoliberalist approach of the individualization of responsibility. Similarly, 
discussions on the type and level of conditionality varied among the countries and again 
followed the pattern of conditionality predicted by the welfare regime theory. Hence, not only 
were variations observed in the level of support for the conditionalities in policies, but more 
importantly for the purposes of this paper, the reasoning for why such conditionalities must be 
imposed varied across the countries.  
 
Our qualitative and small-scale study is not representative; yet it has an explorative value, which 
is useful as a starting point for future research on the rationale of citizens’ support for family 
policies. As such, it offers one piece in the jigsaw to fully understand individuals’ preferences 
and hence complements the more widespread quantitative approach to deciphering welfare state 
attitudes. Our results on how the conditionalities in family policies are viewed in different 
welfare regime contexts suggest the need to bridge the hitherto largely isolated debates on social 
citizenship, individual responsibilities and role of the state in a neoliberal era on one hand, and 
on family policies and gender relations on the other (Lüth, 2021). How are family policies 
included in activation welfare measures? What is the individual–familial responsibilities 
relationship in various institutional set-ups with different conceptions of social citizenship? 
Here, our results may open up new routes for future research on the shifting ideas about the role 
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Endnotes 
1. We use n.i. as an abbreviation for non-identified; other quotes are marked with codes 
assigned to the participants.  
2. High female employment and universal childcare was a crucial characteristic of the former 
East Germany. 
3. Single parents receive the benefit for one extra child. Two further supplements with several 
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Appendix: Extended information on the focus group data collection 
and coding analysis  
 
The focus group data were gathered as part of the NORFACE-funded WelfSOC project 
focusing on citizens’ attitudes to the welfare state, particularly their aspirations for the welfare 
state’s future in their individual country. Led by the coordinator Peter Taylor-Gooby 
(University of Kent), national teams in five European countries (UK, Slovenia, Denmark, 
Norway and Germany) conducted two different types of group discussions in each country: 
deliberative forums and focus groups. Due to two different methodological approaches and 
content focuses being used, the data relied on in the paper are based on the focus groups.  
Focus group discussions in the respective countries had the same set-up with regard to each 
group’s composition, duration, structure and moderation. Participants in all five countries 
discussed the same topics following the same order and recruitment procedures, moderation 
guidelines, and organisational set-up agreed upon by the five national research teams. Based on 
the agreed structure and in close cooperation with the national research teams, professional 
research agencies organized the recruitment and moderated the discussions. They provided 
audio- and video-recording as well as transcripts and English translations of all group 
discussions. In the paper, we use data from four countries: the UK, Germany, Norway and 
Slovenia. Denmark was not chosen as a country case because only one country per welfare 
regime was selected. The Danish focus groups also slightly differed in methodological approach 
and had fewer participants.   
The focus groups took place in autumn 2016 in the countries’ capitals London, Berlin, Oslo and 
Ljubljana. In all countries, the focus groups were carried out by research agencies and 
conducted in professional focus group studios with audio/video-recording facilities. Each focus 
group was supposed to represent a distinct social group regarding status and stage of life: the 
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middle class (determined via income, education and occupation), the working class (ditto), 
young people (below 35 years of age), retirees (aged 60 years or above) and women with care 
responsibilities managing work and family life. All participants received a small financial 
reward for their participation.  
Each focus group contained 8–10 participants and each session lasted around two hours and 
followed the same structure in all countries. After an introduction and brainstorming on ‘the 
welfare state’, the moderator presented six vignettes to the participants. These were always in 
the same order: 
 An unemployed person in good health 
 An elderly person in good health; not working anymore 
 A family with roughly the median income and two children under three years 
 A low-income earner on the minimum wage 
 A well-off earner  
 An immigrant 
The moderators asked the participants which social benefits and services the person(s) shown 
on the vignettes should receive and what should be demanded from them – and why. When 
participants expressed their views, the moderators asked for specifications, and why certain 
aspects mattered to the participants. Each vignette was discussed for 15–20 minutes. At the end, 
the focus groups were asked to rank the vignettes regarding whom the welfare state should care 
the most/least and to discuss the resulting rank order and justify their ranking decisions.  
English translations of transcripts of the focus group discussions were coded in NVivo using a 
comparative and commonly agreed coding scheme, relying on a combination of deductive and 
inductive approaches to the coding. In the first round of coding, we used a rough deductive set 
of codes such as vignettes, representing the six different target groups, followed by a set of 
codes derived from the deservingness theory applying a wide range of conditionalities like need, 
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control, reciprocity, attitude (gratefulness), behaviour (conduct, ongoing benefit), identity 
(coded for nationality), category (coded for different groups single mothers, refugees, women, 
older people etc.). We also applied more inductive codes such as a moral/normative rationale 
(it is the right thing to do), self-interest rationale, utilitarian/fiscal 
(institutional/structural/efficiency) rationale and others. Afterwards, we performed a second 
round of coding based on the deductive coding categories derived from the theoretical 
background of the article, as well as inductive codes that arose in the first-round data analysis. 
The coding scheme was as follows. First, we looked at a statement’s rationale and whether it is 
based on social rights  or social investment justifications (with the subcodes “economic 
rationale” (labour market) and “social rationale”). Second, we distinguished child-centred from 
parent-centred arguments and unconditional/universal from conditional statements (where we 
divided subcodes into “income related” (means test, only for the poor), “need” (number of 
children, e.g. large families, single parents) and “reciprocity” (employment as a condition, they 
pay taxes, the children will pay back when they grow up).  Based on these systematic two 
rounds of coding, which were also double-checked by different co-authors, we performed a 
systematic comparative analysis of the participants’ attitudes to family policy in the four case 
countries.   
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